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This paper studies the role of entrepreneurs in investment tie formation in science-based
entrepreneurial firms. Specifically, we address why investment tie formation is path depen-
dent for some firms but more amenable to intentional management for others. Using longi-
tudinal case studies, our evidence suggests that early investment tie formation is path
dependent because scientific entrepreneurs typically approach only one or a few prospec-
tive investors from within their institutional context. Differences in experience between early
investors affect the professionalization of entrepreneurial teams (or lack thereof), which
influences the extent to which subsequent investment tie formation becomes more ame-
nable to intentional management or remains path dependent.
Introduction
Science-based entrepreneurial firms play a key role in our modern, knowledge-based
economies (Knockaert, Ucbasaran, Wright, & Clarysse, 2011). These firms not only
compete on the basis of the ideas they generate, but also on their ability to attract resources
that allow them to develop and commercialize their ideas (Janney & Folta, 2003). Invest-
ment ties with venture capital (VC) investors are one of the earliest and most critical ties
formed by science-based firms because they provide both financial resources and value-
adding services (Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996). Extant research on investment tie
formation often takes the perspective of VC investors and portrays entrepreneurs as more
or less passive bystanders (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008). Rather than taking
Please send correspondence to: Tom Vanacker, tel.: +32-9-264-7960; e-mail: TomR.Vanacker@UGent.be,
to Sophie Manigart at Sophie.Manigart@Vlerick.be, and to Miguel Meuleman at Miguel.Meuleman@
Vlerick.be.
PTE &
1042-2587
© 2013 Baylor University
1January, 2013
DOI: 10.1111/etap.12007
the perspective of VC investors, we take the perspective of entrepreneurs and ask the
following questions: (1) How do scientific entrepreneurs influence early tie formation with
VC investors; and (2) how do these early investment tie decisions influence subsequent tie
formation?
These questions are important for at least two reasons. First, research that puts
entrepreneurs in the foreground and shows how they influence investment tie formation is
just developing (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Zhang, Souitaris, Soh, & Wong, 2008; Zott
& Huy, 2007). Most of these studies highlight how entrepreneurs with relevant experi-
ence, business education, or prior working relationships may increase the pool of VC
investors from which they can raise finance. Zhang et al. further show how industrial work
experience increases the likelihood that entrepreneurs use their existing ties to search
for start-up finance, while entrepreneurs without such experience search for VC finance
through market mechanisms. Yet, the probability of raising VC finance through market
mechanisms is low (Shane & Cable, 2002). Little is known on how entrepreneurs with
limited business experience and few relevant ties successfully affiliate with VC investors.
Nevertheless, many science-based firms are founded by scientists with little business
experience or ties in the investment community (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005) and for
whom the value-adding services provided by VC investors are hence particularly valuable
(Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Knockaert & Vanacker, 2013).
Second, few studies consider the impact of early VC investment partner decisions on
future financial resource mobilization (Hsu, 2004). Opposing views exist with respect to
the evolution of investment ties. One view suggests that entrepreneurs can manage the
formation of ties as the resource requirements of their firms change, and this is irrespective
of existing ties (Hite, 2005; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Larson & Starr, 1993). Another view
indicates that tie formation becomes increasingly path dependent and is heavily deter-
mined by the identity of early investors (Hallen, 2008). Recently, Zhang et al. (2008)
showed heterogeneity in the extent to which initial investment tie formation is path
dependent and relies on existing ties. In this study, we focus on the extent to which future
tie formation becomes more path dependent versus more amenable to intentional man-
agement. By doing so, we contribute to a call for more longitudinal studies on how
entrepreneurs influence tie formation (Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010; Zhang et al.).
We address our research questions by conducting nine longitudinal case studies to
capture both the early search for investors and the subsequent evolution of investment ties.
The lack of fine-grained insights on the role of entrepreneurs in investment tie formation
(Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010) guided our decision to employ a case study approach. Our
research context is that of biotech firms forming ties with VC investors. We first provide
a brief theoretical background on tie formation, followed by a discussion of the case study
method. Next, we develop the insights gained from the cases. Finally, we discuss our main
findings from theoretical and practical perspectives.
Theoretical Background
At least two views exist to frame the formation of ties. One view argues that entre-
preneurs have an ability to intentionally create, adapt, and control ties as their firms
develop (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Larson & Starr, 1993). Hite (2005), for instance, argues
that entrepreneurs may proactively manage the evolutionary processes and paths of
relationally embedded ties to enhance a firm’s growth. Sophisticated entrepreneurs often
take an active role in investment tie formation through the use of network-broadening
actions and negotiation strategies (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Zott & Huy, 2007).
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Overall, this view argues that entrepreneurs use strategies to increase partnering options
and have the flexibility to choose among investors irrespective of prior relationships.
A second view argues that tie formation is path dependent due to factors outside the
control of entrepreneurs (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). The preferences of investors,
for instance, may create and maintain path dependence in investment tie formation
(Hallen, 2008). Specifically, VC investors prefer to form ties with firms located close to
them, and headed by entrepreneurs with proven track records and prior working relation-
ships (Beckman, Burton, & O’Reilly, 2007; Cumming & Dai, 2010; Hsu, 2007; Shane &
Cable, 2002). From these early ties, future ties evolve as existing investors exhibit a
tendency to restrict the formation of new ties to their direct partners and their partners’
partners (Hallen; Meuleman, Lockett, Manigart, & Wright, 2010). This view implies that
history has a great impact on the evolution of ties given that existing ties create a
path-dependent environment.
This paradox of intentional management versus path-dependent evolution of ties
has received limited attention (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Some have argued that these two
opposing views correspond to different phases in firm development, but even here scholars
disagree. On the one hand, Hite and Hesterly argue that tie formation in new firms initially
starts as highly path dependent, given the reliance of entrepreneurs upon their existing
social network (Larson & Starr, 1993). However, as new firms move toward early growth
and require different resources, the formation of ties becomes more amenable to inten-
tional management. On the other hand, Hallen (2008) argues that intentional management
might be effective during initial tie formation, whereas the formation of later ties is path
dependent and primarily depends on a new firm’s initial ties. Zhang et al. (2008), however,
show that even within the start-up phase, heterogeneity exists with respect to the extent
to which entrepreneurs rely on existing ties. The dominant view, which suggests that the
stage of new firm development determines the path-dependent nature of tie formation, is
hence incomplete.
Methods
As current theoretical perspectives offer limited guidance to understand heterogeneity
in the path-dependent evolution versus intentional management of ties, formulating
hypotheses for quantitative testing seem premature. We therefore opted for a case study
approach, which is well suited to address how and why questions (Yin, 2003), and to
engage in research that involves observations over time. Studying science-based firms as
they develop helps us to explain how the successful and unsuccessful formation of
investment ties unfolds over time (Van de Ven, 2007).
Research Design
To minimize external variation beyond the phenomenon of interest, it is suggested to
choose one homogeneous research field (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Following this suggestion,
we focused on investment tie formation in Flemish biotech start-ups. This has at least three
additional advantages.
First, focusing on biotech start-ups allows us to focus on tie formation with VC
investors. More traditional sources of finance, such as internal finance and debt finance,
are often unavailable and even unsuitable for young biotech firms (Pisano, 2006). Before
biotech firms can raise finance from pharmaceutical firms or public equity markets, they
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first need to raise several rounds of VC (Pisano). In addition, given that biotech firms are
characterized by high uncertainty, resource constraints are acute. In this context, forming
investment ties is of heightened importance, and entrepreneurs are likely to devote
significant time and energy to these activities.
Second, prior studies mainly attribute changes in the path-dependent nature of tie
formation to firm development and performance (Hallen, 2008; Hite & Hesterly, 2001).
In our context, it is unlikely that systematic differences in firm performance will drive
heterogeneity in the path-dependent nature of investment tie formation. Even when
biotech firms reach the stage where they conduct an initial public offering (IPO), these
firms have typically not realized any sales yet and still need millions to develop uncertain
technologies into products (Janney & Folta, 2003). Given that performance differences
between biotech firms are difficult to evaluate at IPO, we expect this to be even more the
case in our setting, which focuses on tie formation between founding and exit. As such,
the biotech setting helps to identify processes other than firm performance that explain
tie formation.
Third, Flemish biotech firms are typically founded by pure scientists. This is similar
to other Continental European biotech industries but stands in contrast to the United
Kingdom and the United States, where scientific entrepreneurs have often accumulated
founding experience (Maurer & Ebers, 2006). Prior research has largely focused on
investment tie formation in unique contexts, such as Silicon Valley or the Boston area,
where entrepreneurs are often more experienced, or sampled cases where entrepreneurs
received business education (e.g., Hallen, 2008; Hsu, 2004, 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007). Our
study is set in a developing entrepreneurial ecosystem, where founding teams often lack
business experience.
We followed the suggestion that research based on cases has between 4 and 10 cases
to reach theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989a). We selected nine cases from start-ups
in the biotech industry controlling for location, firm origin, and market sentiment. Biotech
start-ups are defined as dedicated biotech firms, active in research and development, and
founded between 1999 and 2003 in Flanders. This implies that firms were at maximum 5
years old at the time of initial data collection. Table 1 provides information on the cases
(the names of the firms are disguised to ensure confidentiality).
Data Collection
The first phase of data collection consisted of semi-structured interviews conducted
in 2003 with founding entrepreneurs and senior managers in biotech firms. Interviews
took between 90 and 120 minutes, and followed a pretested interview guide. During the
interviews, we asked for background information, such as composition of the entrepre-
neurial team, alliances, and products in the pipeline. We then asked informants to provide
information with respect to the financing of their firms. We also conducted interviews
with investors that offered finance to the cases studied. We discussed the different phases
in the investment process from deal origination through exit. A second wave of interviews
in 2004 specifically focused on the formation of investment ties over time. We asked
entrepreneurs to discuss chronologically the financing history of their firms. Access to
yearly financial accounts allowed interviewers to prepare a financing timeline in advance
of each interview, capturing the history of the investment ties formed. During the inter-
views, we also discussed the finance unsuccessfully applied for and the finance sources
that entrepreneurs were not willing to consider. In total, we conducted over 40 interviews,
including pilot interviews, 15 interviews with biotech entrepreneurs and managers, 10
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interviews with investors, and additional telephone interviews with biotech team members
to cross-check information obtained from the interviews.
We limit recall bias by studying firms that were at maximum 5 years old at the time
of initial data collection and where the formation of investment ties are major events
(Zhang et al., 2008). Triangulation of multiple data sources further helped to minimize
the effects of retrospection (Yin, 2003). In addition to interviews, we had access to (1) the
business plans that some of the firms used to raise early finance, (2) financial statement
data and statutory required publications on capital increases and shareholder structure,
and (3) archival data, including websites and business publications.
Data Analysis
Transcriptions alone totaled over 700 pages. We started by building individual cases,
synthesizing the interview transcripts and archival sources. Case histories were used for
within-case and cross-case analyses. The within-case analysis focused on the successful
and unsuccessful formation of investment ties, and provided important facts for the
individual cases. Within-case analysis allowed us to describe tie formation as experienced
by a single case. Next, the conclusions from each individual case were considered
information needing replication by other cases (Yin, 2003). We used cross-case analysis
techniques to look for similarities and differences across cases.
Results
Entrepreneurship research by its very nature involves the study of “beginnings”
(Forbes, Borchert, Zellmer-Bruhn, & Sapienza, 2006), and hence we start the presentation
of our results with detailing the mechanisms that drive the search by scientific entre-
preneurs for their early VC investors. Next, we proceed with how these early decisions
influence subsequent tie formation.
The Search for Early Investors by Scientific Entrepreneurs
Research has typically portrayed VC investors as the more powerful actors in tie
formation (Katila et al., 2008). It is often assumed that once entrepreneurs decide to raise
outside finance, VC investors can select from the entire pool of firms that are willing
to raise outside finance (Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006). VC investors, for instance,
are described to exhibit a local bias: They mostly invest in geographically close firms
(Cumming & Dai, 2010). Within their local markets, VC investors typically select entre-
preneurs with proven reputations and prior working relationships (Beckman et al., 2007;
Hallen, 2008; Hsu, 2007; Shane & Cable, 2002). In this stream of research, entrepreneurs
are portrayed as passive and largely unable to influence the identity of their early VC
investors.
Recent studies have focused on the role of entrepreneurs in the formation of invest-
ment ties, but have largely focused on entrepreneurs with relevant experience, business
education, or existing ties in the finance community (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Zott &
Huy, 2007). These studies show how more sophisticated entrepreneurs take deliberate
actions to broaden the pool of prospective investors. In our setting, most entrepreneurs are
scientists without business experience or education. Interestingly, our data revealed that
the search behavior of entrepreneurs in science-based firms constrains the pool of VC
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investors that could invest at an early stage. Specifically, Table 2 shows that entrepreneurs
limited the number of investors they approached during their search for early finance.
These investors were either related to the firm through institutional linkages or to a lesser
extent related to the entrepreneurs through existing personal (direct or indirect) ties. Our
cases thereby suggest that early investment tie formation in science-based firms is highly
path dependent, given the reliance of entrepreneurs upon existing ties.
A possible cause of this restricted search behavior is that entrepreneurs had no
alternative as a consequence of constraints imposed by the supply side of the market (e.g.,
the investment preference of VC investors). While partially possible, this explanation
is doubtful. Scientific entrepreneurs often refrained from testing the market for credible
alternatives. For example, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Pharmaleads, a university
Table 2
The Impact of Scientific Entrepreneurs on Early Investors
Facts Illustrative quotes IL† PR†
Aptanomics Aptanomics raised finance from a highly
experienced investor. This experienced investor
has financed nearly all spin-offs from the
research institute.
✓
Genom Corporate spin-off getting finance from parent
company. Did not look for other potential
equity investors.
“The CEO did not need to look for money, it
was provided by the two parent companies.”
✓
Theraptosis University spin-off getting finance from university
fund. Did not look for other potential equity
investors.
“It was the logical choice in the case of a
spin-off.”
✓
AC Pharma University spin-off getting finance from university
fund and its shareholders.
“The firm is a university spin-off and one of our
investors is the university spin-off fund. . . .
All initial investors in our firm are also
shareholders of the university fund.”
✓
Pharmaleads University spin-off getting finance from university
funds. Did not look for other potential equity
investors.
“It is the norm for spin-offs from universities to
start talking to the seed funds of universities.
With the university fund we had the most
obvious link.”
✓
Myosic Spin-off getting finance from a corporate and
university fund. Did not look for other equity
investors.
“When searching for funding it appeared to be
logical to have resources from the investors
with whom the company and entrepreneur
already had contacts.”
✓ ✓
Entomed CEO contacted a business professor and relied
solely on him to locate an investor. There was a
friendship between the university professor and
the senior investment manager of the initial
investor.
✓
Irogene Corporate spin-off getting finance from parent
company. Tried to attract finance
(unsuccessfully) from a small number of
investors, besides the parent company.
“Contacts were first initiated with a university
seed fund. When they were not willing to invest
the parent company provided finance.”
✓
I-Zyme Spin-off getting start-up finance from research
institute. Did not look for other equity
investors, besides some loose contacts.
“The institute had the idea to spin-off the
company and was willing to invest. Afterwards,
there were some contacts with business angels,
but not more, things did not get any further.”
✓
Notes: † Where IL indicates institutional linkage(s) and PR indicates personal relationship(s).
Source: Interviews.
CEO, chief executive officer.
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spin-off, did not contact other investors. He stated, “We did not need to contact other VC
investors or business angels because we were able to raise equity from the university
fund.”
Why do scientific entrepreneurs then limit their search for early investors to one or a
few investors? First, science-based firms are typically embedded in universities, research
institutes, or parent companies, bringing about their own culture, norms, and procedures
(Moray & Clarysse, 2005). Our cases suggest that informal norms direct entrepreneurs’
early search efforts toward VC investors located within their founding context. When
entrepreneurs justify actions with the claim that “everybody does it this way,” they refer
to institutionalized activities (Oliver, 1997). In Pharmaleads and Theraptosis, two univer-
sity spin-offs, the CEOs justified why they only searched for finance from university funds
by indicating that it is the norm for spin-offs to do so. The CEO of Pharmaleads stated: “It
is the norm for university spin-offs to start talking to the seed fund of universities.”
Second, the search for investors in imperfect markets is a function of the amount of
information that is available to entrepreneurs, and information deficiencies limit entre-
preneurs’ set of choices (Seghers, Vanacker, & Manigart, 2012). Information asymmetry
and bounded rationality entail that scientific entrepreneurs are unlikely to be aware of
all potential investors and are unable to negotiate with all these investors (Eisenhardt &
Zbaracki, 1992). Moreover, cognitive limits make it unlikely that entrepreneurs will enter
negotiations with all potential investors. Boundedly rational entrepreneurs, therefore, tend
to rely on rules and norms when approaching early investors. A major benefit of relying
on institutional linkages is that they help entrepreneurs in identifying where the needed
resources are available (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Rangan, 2000). The CEO of AC Pharma
indicated: “There are two reasons why the firm found its initial investors relatively easily.
One reason is that the firm is a university spin-off and one of our investors is the univer-
sity spin-off fund . . . and all initial investors in our firm are also shareholder of the
university fund.” Thus, scientific entrepreneurs often find it easier to locate prospective
investors within their institutional context.
In addition, entrepreneurs possess private information, which makes funding by VC
investors challenging (Eisenhardt, 1989b). The risk of expropriation makes scientific
entrepreneurs especially reluctant to disclose critical information when searching for early
investors. The following quotes of investors illustrate that the transfer of information is
perceived as a problem by scientific entrepreneurs: “Particularly pre-investment, entre-
preneurs are wary to disclose all information to us. . . . We live in a competitive world and
have a large number of portfolio firms. It happens that a firm that looks for finance is a
competitor of one of our portfolio firms or that there is at least a partial overlap. Therefore,
information transfer is often a problem . . .” Disclosure is less problematic if funding is
sought from VC investors within the firm’s founding context, as goal alignment makes
entrepreneurs perceive lower agency risks vis-à-vis these investors. The following quote
from an investor illustrates: “Unwillingness to provide information is something which is
more common with external entrepreneurs. It is less of a problem if we work with
scientists from our own university.” Information problems and perceived agency risks
further contribute to limiting entrepreneurs’ early search for funding to their institutional
context.
Overall, early investment tie formation by scientific entrepreneurs is highly path
dependent, given the reliance of these entrepreneurs upon preexisting linkages. Thus:
Proposition 1: Scientific entrepreneurs are likely to limit their search for prospective
VC investors to those investors located within their institutional context because of
institutional norms, bounded rationality, and informational asymmetries.
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Following proposition 1, investment tie formation in science-based firms can be
viewed as a multistage selection process, in which scientific entrepreneurs select the pool
of VC investors they want to approach, and VC investors subsequently select from the
pool of firms that are presented to them. This behavior limits the pool of early-stage firms
VC investors have access to. The search process defined here is a further refinement of the
selection model presented by Eckhardt et al. (2006), who assume that investors have
access to all firms once they are willing to raise outside finance.
Early Investor Decisions and the Ability of Entrepreneurs to Influence
Investment Tie Formation
A key question is whether the early choice of investors has implications for subse-
quent investment tie formation (Cumming & Dai, 2013; Hsu, 2004; Zhang et al., 2008).
Our cases show how entrepreneurs typically become more comprehensive in their search
for investors as firms develop. For instance, we observed that it is not uncommon for
entrepreneurs to contact 20 investors when preparing for follow-on finance rounds. Nev-
ertheless, although entrepreneurs become more comprehensive in their search, we also
observe that the identity of early investors has a great impact on the extent to which future
investment tie formation becomes more amenable to intentional management or remains
path dependent. Later, we elaborate on this finding.
Differences in Tie Formation Between Science-Based Firms Backed by Experienced
Versus Inexperienced VC Investors. Our cases suggest that the experience of early
investors influences the degree to which entrepreneurs can intentionally manage subse-
quent tie formation. Table 3 shows investor characteristics and the finance rounds in which
they participated. It highlights how subsequent investment tie formation is very different
between firms affiliating early on with experienced VC investors and firms without such
experienced investors. We define VC investors as experienced when they (1) actively
target and invest in biotechnology firms, and (2) have a team dedicated to evaluate and
follow up biotech proposals.
Three observations emerge from Table 3. First, science-based firms backed by expe-
rienced investors during their first or second finance round raise larger amounts of
follow-on finance on more occasions compared with firms backed by inexperienced
investors. Second, science-based firms backed by experienced investors in an early round
are able to attract a larger number of VC investors compared with firms backed by
inexperienced investors. Third, science-based firms backed by experienced investors
typically raise follow-on finance from other experienced investors. When inexperi-
enced investors join an experienced investment syndicate, they do not take up a lead
position (Lerner, 1994). In addition, when local experienced investors contribute finance,
international-experienced VC investors are more likely to join in later rounds. In contrast,
science-based firms backed by inexperienced investors often raise follow-on finance from
other inexperienced investors. The founder of Entomed indicated that it became clear after
the first round of finance from an inexperienced investor that for subsequent rounds,
“experienced investors would be better because of their expertise and help for manage-
ment.” Despite his attempts to attract more experienced investors, he failed to do so. In
sum, cases initially backed by more experienced investors have access to a broader pool
of high-quality investors compared with cases backed by inexperienced investors.
The following quotes further illustrate how science-based firms starting with ex-
perienced investors have more partnering options compared with firms starting with
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inexperienced investors. The CEO of Aptanomics, backed by experienced investors
from start-up, contacted about 50 VC investors to raise follow-on finance as the invest-
ment climate was bad. He thought “better contact more than less,” expecting that 10%
would respond positively. “This would have given us 5 investors to negotiate with,
which was fine. Surprisingly, 90% responded positively. We ended up with more than
40 investors to talk with and that was a problem. So, choices had to be made.” The CEO
of Theraptosis, backed by an experienced investor, commented on his search for a
subsequent finance round: “We talked with some 20 VC investors” and “The firm even-
tually raised 3 million euro more than it initially expected to raise.” On the other hand,
the CEO of Pharmaleads, backed by inexperienced investors, mentioned: “Pharmaleads
was developing its drug discovery strategy. However, this could only be achieved if
additional financial resources were raised. European VC investors were contacted,
among which [were] UK VC investors, because there are many knowledgeable VC
investors in the UK.” Pharmaleads was unable to raise finance from new investors,
however. “As a consequence of not getting funding, Pharmaleads was forced to restruc-
ture itself and scale down.”
In sum, the above suggests that science-based firms backed by experienced investors
face few constraints induced by past partnering decisions when attempting to form new
investment ties. These findings coincide with Hite and Hesterly (2001) who portray tie
formation as amenable to intentional management. In the cases where firms raise early
finance from inexperienced investors, investment tie formation becomes more path
dependent, however. These findings correspond with Hallen (2008) who indicates that
investment tie formation becomes increasingly path dependent.
The Differential Role of Experienced and Inexperienced Investors in Professionalizing
the Management Team of Portfolio Firms. Why is investment tie formation more ame-
nable to intentional management in firms initially backed by more experienced investors
but more path dependent in firms initially backed by inexperienced investors? Prior
research, which focused on the perspective of VC investors, argues that potential investors
are more likely to collaborate with other investors that they know from prior investments
(Hallen, 2008; Meuleman et al., 2010). Ferrary (2010) further argues that exchanges
between VC investors are based on a reciprocity that follows the principles of gift
exchange theory. Experienced investors, by virtue of being actively involved in the
industry, have more ties to other investors within the biotech investment community
(Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2008) and have more legitimacy, allowing them
to enter more syndicate relationships (Hopp, 2010). The stronger network position of
experienced investors therefore benefits their portfolio firms when searching for follow-on
finance. Firms connecting with inexperienced investors, however, will be more con-
strained in their options for follow-on finance due to the limited social capital of their
initial investors.
Our cases suggest that the (lack of) social capital of early investors only partially
explains our observations. Differences in firm professionalization driven by different VC
investors also impact subsequent investment tie formation. Although prior research indi-
cates that VC investors as a group play an important role in firm professionalization by
appointing outsiders as CEO (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Hellmann & Puri, 2002), our
cases illustrate that especially experienced VC investors play a vital role in professional-
izing firms by shaping their management team, while inexperienced investors play a more
limited role. This is in line with recent research that highlights heterogeneity in value-
adding activities among VC investors (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008; Knockaert &
Vanacker, 2013).
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Table 4 summarizes key changes in management. This table shows that in firms
backed by experienced investors, a CEO is typically hired shortly after the initial invest-
ment. In Aptanomics, the experienced VC investor played a crucial role in hiring a
professional CEO with considerable experience in biotech shortly after founding. This
manager previously held key positions in both domestic and foreign biotech firms. Similar
changes to the scientific founding team were observed in AC Pharma. In Genom, an
experienced manager was transferred from one of the successful biotechnology parents.
Experienced VC investors are not only active around the time of their initial investment,
but they also initiate changes in the team when the firm gets closer to an exit, for instance,
through hiring a professional chief financial officer.
Table 4 suggests that professionalization seldom occurs in firms backed by inexperi-
enced investors. In Pharmaleads and Entomed, both firms backed by inexperienced VC
investors, no changes took place in the management team. The same holds for Irogene,
which was financed by its parent and for I-Zyme, the first spin-off from a research institute
and initially financed by this institute. In Myosic, the inexperienced academic investor and
the corporate investor had doubts about the management qualities of the scientific founder.
Table 4
Key Changes in the Management Team Relating to the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Functions
Professional CEO Professional CFO
Timing Description Timing Description
Aptanomics Start-up year CEO hired, with extensive experience in both
European and U.S. biotechnology start-ups
under impetus initial investor.
4 years after
start-up
New CEO hired with a successful track record in
creating company value and attracting finance
both in private and public area.
4 years after start-up Professional CFO hired.
Genom Start-up year CEO hired from parent company. 5 years after start-up Professional CFO hired.
7 years after start-up New professional CFO hired.
Theraptosis Start-up year CEO with consulting background in the biotech
industry next to scientific entrepreneur.
7 years after start-up Professional CFO hired.
AC Pharma Start-up year CEO hired under impetus initial investor with
consulting background in the biotech industry.
None.
2 years after
start-up
New CEO hired with consulting background in
biotech industry. Previously, informal advisor to
venture capital funds.
Pharmaleads None. None.
Myosic 2 years after
start-up
New CEO hired under impetus initial investor.
Previously cofounded an ICT company and a
medical software venture.
None.
Entomed None. None.
Irogene None. None.
I-Zyme None. None.
Notes: The upper half of the table includes cases that raised finance from experienced venture capital (VC) investors; the
lower half of the table includes cases that did not raise finance from such investors.
Source: Interviews and press releases.
ICT, information and communications technology.
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Despite these concerns, investors accepted that the founder took the lead over the firm. It
was only once his shortcomings became visible through weak progress some 2 years after
founding that a professional CEO was hired. This new CEO, however, had little specific
experience in managing young dedicated biotech firms.
Professionalization of the Management Team and Investment Tie Formation in
Science-Based Firms. The level of professionalization initiated by investors influences
the formation of new investment ties. In firms backed by inexperienced investors,
scientific founders often remain in their firms and continue to play a central role in
negotiations with potential investors. This leads to a situation of stunted learning, which
culminates in a number of disadvantages and thereby limits the flexibility to form ties
with new investors. More specifically, many scientific founders fail to fully develop
the competencies required to manage a business, including the ability to negotiate and
raise large amounts of follow-on finance (e.g., Vohora, Wright, & Lockett, 2004). For
example, in our interviews with scientific entrepreneurs, we sometimes had to clarify
the meaning of common terms used by professional investors. Some scientific founders
asked: “Could you please explain the term cash burn rate?” or “What is the difference
between common and preferred stock?” Further, investors often complain that the busi-
ness plans of biotech firms headed by scientists are not accessible because they are too
focused on the technology. The following quotes illustrate: “One of the most important
shortcomings of biotech business plans is an underdeveloped business model. While
there is often a very interesting scientific concept, people have not thought adequately
about how the technology can be translated into an economic model. Inexperience
makes that timelines and financial plans are unrealistic . . .” and “I can give examples
of business plans from firms that exist for over five years . . . when one looks at those
business plans . . . it still looks like these are written by scientists that work on a
scientific project.”
These quotes illustrate that scientific founders often lack the social competence or
ability to effectively interact with investors (Baron & Markman, 2003), and hence the
possibility to establish investment ties with new partners is limited (Brinckmann, Salomo,
& Gemuenden, 2011). As a result, firms affiliating early on with inexperienced investors
typically find it difficult to obtain follow-on finance from new investors. Investment tie
formation becomes increasingly path dependent and may even lead to a lock-in situation,
where entrepreneurs find no other funds but from their existing investors.
Not all firms experience these problems. Firms backed by experienced investors are
more likely to enter into a cycle of accumulating advantages. Experienced investors
are more likely to strengthen the founding team with experienced managers and finance
specialists, which benefits firms in their search for finance from new investors. Maurer and
Ebers (2006) indicate that firms require specialization within the entrepreneurial team
in order to facilitate changes in their social capital and achieve high growth. Our cases
illustrate how professional managers’ social competence cannot be matched by that of
scientific entrepreneurs. Higher levels of social competence assist professional managers
in gaining the trust and confidence of persons with whom they interact and, therefore, help
them in their efforts to raise capital (Baron & Markman, 2003). Throughout our interviews
with professional managers, we observed how they possessed relevant knowledge on the
VC industry, its trends, and its structure. This enabled them to effectively interact with
potential investors, for example, by adapting themselves to a new context. This social
adaptability is one aspect of their social competence (Baron & Markman). The CEO of
Genom, for instance, recognized that the main business of his firm was out of vogue when
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he approached VC investors. He decided to write a business plan making the firm (at least
look) more attractive to investors given the current investment trends. The firm eventually
received successful offers from multiple investors.
Professional biotech managers have a track record of experiences with raising VC and
as such developed a tested toolbox with routines to approach new investors (Bingham,
Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007). These professional managers are clearly more effective in
interacting with VC investors. Hence, their social competence or ability to interact with
unknown investors is higher compared with that of scientific entrepreneurs (Zhang et al.,
2008). This helps to explain why investment tie formation becomes more amenable to
intentional management in firms backed by more experienced investors. Therefore:
Proposition 2: Experienced investors are more likely to professionalize the entrepre-
neurial team in science-based firms compared with their inexperienced counterparts,
which enhances the social competence of the entrepreneurial team, which in turn makes
investment tie formation more amenable to intentional management (or less path
dependent).
The earlier findings strengthen insights from prior research focusing on the partnering
preferences of VC investors. Firms backed by experienced investors have more partner-
ing options. This is not simply due to the social capital of their experienced VC partners
(which is mainly the focus of prior research), but also because the firms themselves have
more competencies to negotiate with potential investors thanks to a stronger professional-
ization of the entrepreneurial team. Firms backed by inexperienced investors, however,
have fewer partnering options. This is not only because of the limited network of their
early investors but also because of their inability to negotiate with new investors, as
inexperienced investors are less likely to initiate changes to the entrepreneurial team. Thus:
Proposition 3: The partnering preferences of VC investors and VC investors’ profes-
sionalization activities in science-based firms have a mutually reinforcing impact on the
subsequent formation of investment ties and its amenability to intentional management.
Alternative Explanations. Is it the experience of early VC investors that drives subse-
quent tie formation, or do differences in firm quality drive our findings? Differences in
firm quality may matter to some extent but are unlikely to fully drive our findings. First,
all our cases had high growth ambitions at start-up. Entomed, for example, planned to
develop into a professional biotech firm in 2–3 years after founding, employing 25–30
people. In Myosic, the founder envisioned raising some 10 million euro in follow-on
finance. Despite their high growth ambitions at start-up, scientific founders backed by
inexperienced investors were unable to realize them. Second, we measured early quality
signals, including human capital, alliance capital, technology, and target market (Baum &
Silverman, 2004). We found no systematic differences in these early quality signals for
firms that end up with experienced versus inexperienced investors (a detailed comparison
table is available from the authors upon request). Finally, our research context also
minimizes the concern that differences in the performance of firms backed by experienced
versus inexperienced investors explain the extent to which future investment tie formation
becomes more or less amenable to intentional management. Although we observe that
some cases exhibit high growth and other low growth, it is not possible to equate growth
with performance (Davidsson, Steffens, & Fitzsimmons, 2009). Biotech firms may exhibit
low performance despite showing high growth rates. Moreover, finance is more likely to
drive growth in the biotech context rather than the other way around.
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We do not argue that investment tie formation is entirely deterministic. In line
with studies showing entrepreneurial agency in tie formation, it may still be possible
for a science-based firm to raise VC from an experienced VC later on despite having
inexperienced investors at start-up (e.g., Cumming & Dai, 2013). Theraptosis is a
good illustration. This firm raised start-up finance from an inexperienced univer-
sity fund but subsequently raised finance from highly experienced investors. Three
enablers are worth noting in this case. First, a more experienced manager was working
together with the scientific founder from start-up. Second, with the finance raised at
start-up, the firm reached all important milestones, hence demonstrating its manage-
rial and technological abilities. Third, the CEO used an insightful strategy to approach
experienced investors. While he was in a weak position to approach experienced inves-
tors directly, he resorted to network leverage strategies (Gargiulo, 1993). He approached
not only the shareholders of the university-related investor (mostly bank-related inves-
tors), but also more experienced investors that previously worked together with the
shareholders of the university fund. Theraptosis is the only case, however, which started
with an inexperienced investor and subsequently raised finance from experienced
investors.
Discussion and Conclusions
We studied how scientific entrepreneurs influence early tie formation with VC inves-
tors and how these early ties influence subsequent tie formation. By doing so, we add to
the VC literature in several ways. First, prior studies have either taken the perspective of
VC investors when studying investment tie formation (Katila et al., 2008) or focused on
how sophisticated entrepreneurs may increase the pool of VC investors that are willing to
provide finance (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). We show that in science-based firms, where
entrepreneurs generally have limited business experience, entrepreneurs often restrict
their search for early VC investors to one or a few investors located in their founding
context. Our findings add nuance to the two-stage selection model of Eckhardt et al.
(2006) who assume that investors have access to all firms once they are willing to raise
outside finance.
Second, VC syndication studies often assume that once firms attract finance from
experienced investors with broad networks, new investors join through a semiautomatic
process, where new investors will provide finance based on the identity of early investors
(e.g., Hallen, 2008; Meuleman et al., 2010). We show that this is only part of the story.
Inexperienced investors are more likely to keep scientists in the position of managing
their firms, which leads to a situation of stunted learning, where scientific founders
lack the capabilities to negotiate with investors. Firms backed by inexperienced investors
indeed raise limited, if any, follow-on finance typically from a limited pool of in-
experienced domestic investors and have limited options to choose between investors.
Experienced investors are more likely to professionalize entrepreneurial teams, which
contributes to the competence of these teams to negotiate with investors. This leads to a
cycle of accumulating advantages, where firms backed by experienced VC investors can
benefit from the latter’s social capital, and professional managers use their social com-
petence to capitalize on this. Firms backed by experienced investors indeed raise more
finance on more occasions from a broader set of investors and have more options to
choose between investors. We also add to the literature on path dependence versus
intentional management of ties by showing how investment tie formation becomes more
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or less amenable to intentional management depending upon the experience of early
investors.
This research has a number of limitations that lead to directions for future research.
First, we showed that one key difference between experienced and inexperienced inves-
tors is that the former are more likely to introduce changes to the entrepreneurial team.
This influences the capabilities of teams to negotiate with investors, which further
explains why subsequent investment tie formation is more or less amenable to inten-
tional management. The entire spectrum of issues associated with tie formation (and
differences between firms backed by experienced or inexperienced investors) is too
extensive to be explored in one article. Following the suggestion of Van de Ven (2007),
we put some issues in the foreground, but other issues in the background. We are
mindful of the wider range of issues, however, such as the differential role of expe-
rienced and inexperienced investors in the board of directors (Rosenstein, Bruno,
Bygrave, & Taylor, 1993). Another aspect that warrants more research relates to the
contracts used by different investors. Strong contracts allow for good governance by VC
investors (Cumming & Johan, 2009), which may also influence future investment
tie formation. Future studies may focus in greater detail on what different VC investors
are doing differently within their portfolio firms and how this influences firm-level
processes such as investment tie formation.
Second, because our research setting is a special case, our conclusions must be
tentative. It is not clear how our conclusions might relate to firms in other industries. As
our focus was on theory building, further research is needed to formulate the proposi-
tions we developed into hypotheses and to test them on large samples (Yin, 2003).
However, the framework we developed suggests a rich avenue for further research on
how entrepreneurs with limited business experience, together with their early investors,
affect the formation of investment ties. Specifically, future work may focus in more
detail on the conditions under which entrepreneurs limit their search for finance to one
or a few investors and when they engage in a broader search. Future work also needs
to focus more on how the interaction between VC investor characteristics and portfolio
firm characteristics influence subsequent investment tie formation. A good example
in this direction is the study by Cumming and Dai (2013), which shows among other
things that firms with upwardly revised perceived quality are more likely to switch to
more reputable lead VC investors relative to existing lead VC investors. Further, future
studies could look into how entrepreneurs manage lock-in situations with existing inves-
tors. Lastly, a question that deserves more attention is how some young and inexperi-
enced VC investors manage to occupy privileged positions in the overall network of the
VC industry and attract high-quality deal flow.
This study contributes to practice by improving entrepreneurs’ understanding
of investment tie formation in science-based firms. Our results point entrepreneurs
to the relevance of searching for finance from investors outside their institutional
context, especially when investors in the institutional context are inexperienced.
Scientific founders should also be aware that they might have to switch positions
to attract more desirable investors. Our results are important for VC investors as
well. First, given the required expertise and network structure to guide young biotech
firms, it might be a better strategy for inexperienced investors to act only as nonlead
investors in syndicates with more experienced peers. Second, VC investors should be
aware that even when they are experienced, they do not necessarily have access to the
entire range of early stage investment opportunities. Active deal origination is critical
to increase the supply of high-quality proposals where investors have the first option to
invest.
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